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Global environmental concerns have increased the sensitivity of governments and other
parties to the actions of those outside their national jurisdiction. Parties have tried to extend
influence extraterritorially both by promising to reward desired behavior and by threatening to
punish undesired behavior. If information were perfect, the Coase theorem would suggest that
either method of seeking influence could pmvide an efficient outcome, if the parties in question
have incomplete information about each other's costs and benefits from different actions,
however, either method can be costly, both to those seeking influence and in terms of overall
efficiency. We compare various methods of seeking influence. A particular issue is dissembling:
taking an action to mislead the other party about the cost or benefit of that action. By creating
an incentive to dissemble, attempts to influence another's behavior can have the perverse effect
of actually encouraging the action that one is trying to discourage.
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The correction of externalities requires that individuals affected by the
decisions of others have ways of influencing those decisions. Within national
boundaries laws and contracts typically perform this function. A third party,
the legal system, can enforce laws against undesired actions, or subsidize
rewards for desirable actions. It can also enforce long-term contracts among
the interested parties. Parties who are in different countries, or who are
themselves governments of different countries, may lack a third party
enforcement mechanism. The parties involved must then rely on their own
devices to trytoinfluence the decisions of others.
Onewayto do this is through whatSchelling(1960, 1965) calls brute
forces taking direct physical control of the action in question. In this
paper we consider less extreme forms of seeking influence: rewarding others
for refraining from undesired actions, or punishing others for carrying them
out.t In an international context, the punishments involved are usually
called sanctions.
Our main aim is to understand and to evaluate international institutions
to preserve the quality of the environment, treaties to protect the
environment have contained various provisions both to reward countries for
pursuing environmentally sound policies, and to punish them for polluting.2
The problems of limiting nuclear proliferation provide further
motivation. Recent United States policy has varied between threatening to
punishNorth Korea for violating the International Atomic Energy Agreement and
'Dixit(1987) provides alucid discussion of theseissues.
2TheOttawa convention governing the use ofchlorofluorocarbons is an example.
Itcalls both for sanctions against violators and rewards forcompliance.
Parson (1991) provides a description.promising to reward it for compliance.
In a situation of symmetric information the Coase Theorem (1960) suggests
that the only issue is distributional: Seeking influence by either method
ensures an efficient outcome.' As is now widely recognized, however, if the
relevant parties have incomplete information about the costs and benefits of
various actions to each other then the question of how to achieve an efficient
outcome is more complex.'
Our purpose here is to consider the relative benefits of seeking
influence by promising rewards and by threatening punishments, both from the
perspective of the sender and of efficiency in general. to do so we consider
the interaction over time of two parties, called, in the tradition of the
literature on sanctions, the sender and the the tareet.' The sender would
like to discourage the target from taking an action that benefits the target
but harms the sender. The sender can do so by threatening sanctions if the
target takes the action, or by promising a reward for not taking it. Both
means are costly: Sanctions impose &coston the sender as well as on the
target, while rewarding the target requires giving up resources.
We use two devices to aid exposition. First, to help identify the
antecedents of pronouns, we assign a gender to each party, treating the sender
as feminine and the target as masculine. Second, since our focus is on
preventing environmental degradation, we call the offending action of the
target pollution (although in principle it could be any action that the target
5We explore the use of sanctions in a situation of complete information
elsewhere (1992).
'Our analysis relates closely to the literature on sequential bargaining under
incomplete information. Yudenberg and tirole (1991) provide a discussion and
references to the literature.
'See Hufbauer et al. (1990). Other contributions to the literature on
sanctions are Daoudi and Dajani (1983) and ltaempfer and Lowenberg (1988).-3-
could take that is to his own benefit and to the sender's detriment).
Given the range of possible rewards and punishments, and alternative
information structures, there are myriad possible specifications of the
relationship between the parties. We do not attempt to provide even a partial
taxonomy. Instead, we focus on situations that illustrate clearly some
possible merits and deficiencies of using alternative methods of influence.
Since the most serious problems emerge when the sender does not know the
extent to which the, target benefits from polluting, we focus on this
informational asymmetry. Specifically, the sender is unsure whether the
target benefits from polluting by only a small amount, in which case he is
"clean," or by a large amount, in which case he is "dirty." A basic issue is
what the target reveals about his type through his response to the sender's
attempt to influence him. We therefore consider their repeated interaction.
We consider three tools that the sender might use to discourage
pollution:(i) a reward for not polluting; (ii) a mild punishment that is
enough to deter a clean but not a dirty target from polluting; and (iii) a
draconian punishment so severe that it would deter either type of target, but
at a higher cost than the mild one. We consider situations in which the
sender has access to these three tools in various combinations.
Among other things, we consider the following questions: To what extent
do different combinations of tools work to the sender's advantage? What
inefficiencies can arise in different situations? When would the sender
benefit by committing herself to a policy for the duration of the relationship
rather than by choosing a policy each period? Could she ever do better by
committing herself to "laissez-faire," taking fl2 action to influence the
target?
No single method among the cases we consider dominates any of the others,-4-
either in terms of benefiting the sender or in avoiding inefficient outcomes.
What is best for the sender or most efficient overall depends on the specific
situation. We find that the sender often could do better by committing to a
policy over the two periods. In some cases the sender facesthe dilemrDa that
her attempts to seek influence lead to a worse outcome for her, and to more
poliption. than would a policy of laissez-faire, if she could commit tosuch a
policy.
Basic to our results is the way that the sender would treat targets of
different types. Unless the sender has access to the draconian sanction, she
treats a dirty target more favorably than a clean one: If using rewards, she
would promise a larger one to a dirty type, since he requires greater
compensation not to pollute, while she would not incur the cost of the mild
sanction in dealing with a dirty target, since it would not work.
Because the sender treats a dirty target more favorably, a clean one has
an incentive to bluff,' i.e., to try to pass himself off as dirty: A clean
target might pollute rather than accept a reward that exceeds his benefit from
polluting to try to elicit a higher reward later. Alternatively, a clean
target might pollute and suffer sanctions to try to make the sender think that
is not worth renewing them.
When the sender has access to both a draconian sanction and a mild
sanction, however, the clean target no longer has an incentive to make the
sender think that he is dirty. Once the sender is sure enough that she is
dealing with a dirty target she simply resorts to the draconian sanction.
Hence in this case the dirty target, rather than the clean one, has the
incentive to conceal his type, acting asa wolfin sheep's clothing:' The
dirty target mimics the clean target to convince the sender that she does not
need the draconian sanction to deter pollution. Having fooled the sender the-5-
target then goes ahead and pollutes1 suffering only the mild sanction.
We proceed as follows: Section II presents the basic structure of our
analysis. Sections III through VI consider specific situations in detail.
Section VII offers some concluding remarks.
II. The Basic Structure
We use D to denote the amount of damage done to the sender by the
target's pollution. This amount is known to both. The target's benefit from
polluting could either be a high amount H if he is dirty or a low amount L
(where H >L > 0) ifhe is clean. The true amount is known by the target, but
the sender is unsure. She initially believes that the target is dirty with
probability 8 and is clean with probability l8l. The han that the target's
action inflicts on the sender exceeds whatever benefit the target derives from
it. Hence D >H > L.From a social perspective, then, the target's action is
inefficient.'
The two parties interact for two periods, the smallest number allowing us
to examine how the target might modify his actions in one period to influence
the sender's subsequent beliefs. For simplicity we assume no discounting.
Within each period the two parties interact as follows: The sender
begins period i believing that the target is dirty with probability O. On
the basis of this belief she either promises the target a reward for not
polluting, threatens to punish him if he does pollute, or does both in some
combination. In order to punish the target that period, the sender must, at
'If D is less than H the problem, with rewards, is triviAl: If D >Lthe
sender offers L. This offer is accepted by a clean target and rejected by a
dirty one. The clean target has no prospect of eliciting a higher reward
later. If D < L the sender offers no reward. Pollution always occurs. In
both cases the outcome is efficient.-6-
this point, incur asunkcost C regardless of whether or not she then punishes
the target. This cost could represent, for example, the cost of maintaining a
military, which the sender must incur before knowing whether or not the target
will pollute. We assume that the cost of the sanction C is less than than the
amount of damage D that the sender sustains from pollution (or the sanction
would never be used).
Once the sender has made her threats or promises, the target chooses
whether or not to pollute. Polluting raises the target's payoff, depending on
his type, by H or L, and lowers the sender's by D.
What happens next depends on the threats and promises made by the sender
at the beginning of the period and the target's subsequent action. If the
sender had promised a reward then it is paid if and only if the target has
refrained from polluting.' If the sender threatened a punishment and incurred
the sunk cost C then the sender punishes the target, at no additional cost to
herself but at a cost P to the target, if and only if the target has polluted.'
Hence the target's receipt of either the reward or the punishment is
contingent upon the target's behavior, as is the sender's payment of the
reward. The sender must incur the cost of arranging the sanction regardless
of what the target does and whether or not the sanction is actually
implemented.
'We assume that the sender can make a coitment actually to pay R contingent
on the target's not polluting. There are various reasons why the sender would
follow through on her promise. She may, for example, have to deal with
multiple targets, and wish to maintain a reputation for honesty.
Alternatively she may be able to put the payment in escrow under the control
of a third party instructed to make payment to the target if he desists from
polluting and to return the reward to the sender if he pollutes.
'Since at this point the incremental cost of punishing is zero, the commitment
to impose sanctions is weakly credible. We have explored the implications of
introducing a (strictly positive) incremental cost to sanctions (continuing to
asste that the sender is committed to imposing them if the target acts), but
deemed the additional insights yielded by this modification not worth the
added complications..7-
Je consider four specific situations which do not exhaust all logical
possibilities, but together illustrate basic issues that arise in other, more
complicated, circumstances. First are the two pure cases of a sender seeking
influence only through rewards or only through a single sanction. We focus on
the only interesting situation, in which the sanction is mild, i.e.,
H >P>L.'We then consider &senderhaving access to both methods of
influence in combination. Finally, we consider the situation of a sender with
access to either of two sanctions, one of which is mild while the other is
draconian, meaning that the harm that it does to the target exceeds the gain
from polluting of even a dirty target, i.e., P > H. The draconian sanction,
however, requires a larger sunk cost F than the mild sanction, but this sunk
cost is still less than the damage done to the sender by the target's
pollution, i. e., F <0.
Wecharacterize the relationship between the sender and target in terms
of theperfect Bayesian equilibrium of their interaction: Whenever parties
would make decisions, their strategies are optimal given their beliefs, and
they update their beliefs using equilibrium strategies and observed actions
according to Bayes' Rule.'°
For each of our four cases we derive the sender's expected total cost of
dealing with the target, including the cost of paying rewards, imposing
sanctions, and the damage if she fails to deter pollution. We also examine
how inefficient the outcome is.
We now turn to the specifics of each case.
'If the sanction is draconian (P > H) then the sender would use it, and
successfully deter all pollution. If it is totally ineffectual (P < L) it
would never be used.
10See, for example, Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Chapter 8).-8-
III.Rewarding Good Behavior
We first consider a sender who is trying to deter pollution by offering a
reward for not polluting. What happens depends upon therelationshipbetween
the sender's initial belief about the target and the payoffs. Depending on
parametervalues •thereare three kinds of equilibrium outcome.
I. Comtlete PoolinE: If •l >9 where 7— (H-L)j(D-L).then the sender
simplyoffers H each period. Whatever the target's type, he accepts.
In this outcome there is no pollution, and the sender never learns
anything about the target's type. The clean target successfully exploits the
sender's ignorance for twoperiods.
2. Ziuffine: If <, where; —1(H-R)/(D-R)and R can be any number
between t and H, then the sender offers It the first period. The dirty target





If the offer is accepted then in period 2 the sender offers only I., which is
accepted. If the offer is rejected the sender then offers H with probability
Hand L with remaining probability l•r1, where satisfies:
a— (115L+ (2)-9-
The highofferis accepted by either type while the low offer is accepted only
by a clean target.
In this case not only does the dirty target pollute in period 1, but so
might the clean target, who pollutes to try to increase its reward in period
2. In the second period the clean target does not pollute, while the dirty
target does not pollute only if the sender makes a high offer.
3.The Hold-Un: If S >>then the sender offers H in period 1, which is
accepted, and L in period 2, which is accepted only by the clean target.
There is no pollution in the first period, while in the second period the
dirty target pollutes while the clean one does not.
We first describe the parties' optimal strategies at each point in their
interaction, and then show how this behavior yields these three equilibrium
outcomes.
A. Optimal Strategies
We begin with the second period. Since this is the last period of their
interaction the target has no incentive to alter his decisions to affect the
sender's future beliefs. Hence a clean target will accept any reward above L
not to pollute and &dirtyone will accept any reward above H not to pollute.
Depending on the target's type, offers below these amounts are rejected, and
lead to pollution. (We assume that offers just equal to the target's benefit
from polluting are accepted.)-10-
For the sender, offering a reward of Lisbetter than offering any reward
between L and H while offering H iibetterthan any remaining offer. A reward
of H will be accepted by the target regardless of his type, and so will deter
pollution for sure. An offer of L will be accepted by a clean target but
rejected by a dirty one. Based on her initial beliefs and on what happened
the first period, the sender at this point believes that the target is dirty
with probability 9 Hence she believes the low offer will deter pollution
with probability lD2. but will fail to do so with probability 2•
What the sender does depends upon how this probability compares with the
threshold level 9. The sender will offer I. if <1andoffer H if 62 >
If
2— then she is indifferent between these two offers. In this case we
let denote the probability with which she makes the high offer1 so that she
makes the low offer with probability 1-)'.
The dirty target's payoff in the final period is H regardless of which
offer the sender makes: She either rewards him for not polluting with an
amount H, or offers I., in which case he rejects the offer and pollutes,
deriving a benefit of H. Since the clean target accepts either offer, his
benefit is whatever the sender offers, so he prefers the high offer.
We now turn to the first period, beginning with the target's decision.
Since the dirty target enjoys H the second period regardless, he has no
incentive to alter the sender's beliefs about his type. Hence he behaves just
as in the second period, rejecting any offer below H but accepting H or above.
For the clean target things are more complicated. He will obviously
accept any offer above H: It will more than compensate him for the benefit of
polluting and accepting it will not diminish the sender's belief that he is *
dirtytype (since he ii doing the only thing that a dirty type would do).
By accepting a reward below H, however, a clean target reveals his type-11-
to the sender. Since acceptance means that 82 —0,the sender will offer only
L in period 2. Hence accepting any offer P CHyields the clean target R-s-L
over the two periods. (Obviously the target will reject an offer below L
since that would leave him less than the payoff 2L, which he can get by
rejecting all offers).
If the clean target rejects a low reward R, where I, s a <H,his payoff
over the two periods is 2L if the sender offers a reward L in the second
period and Li-H if the sender offers a reward H in the second period. These
two payoffs bracket R+L, the payoff from accepting the offer. Hence what the
clean target does depends on the implications of rejecting the low offer for
the sender's offer the next period.
If the sender makes a low offer and the target rejects it, from Bayes'
rule the sender's posterior belief that the target is dirty is:
P (3)
+
where is the probability that a clean target rejects an offer of a low
reward.
B. Equilibrium Outcomes
lie now show how this behavior gives rise to the three equilibria.
1. Complete Pooling
II 8 >Sthen the sender will offer H in period 2, even if the clean-12-
target rejects low offers with probability one(i"..l). Even though she knows
that the clean target would always bluff, she is sufficiently sure that the
target is dirty that, if an offer of ft in round 1 were rejected, she would
offer H in period 2. In this case, by rejecting any low offer the clean
target would get L+}l, which exceeds what he would get by accepting a low offer
and blowing his cover. Hence, regardless of his type, the target would always
reject low offers in period 1. Since the sender would learn nothing about the
target's type from the rejection of a low offer, she would offer H for sure in
period 2: Making a low offer in period 1 would cost her D-+}l over the two
periods, while offering H, which is accepted by either type, costs her
—211.Thus her best strategy is to offer H each period, which is accepted
by the target regardless of his type.
Th,sender'scost andtheamount of pollution
In this equilibrium the sender's cost is 211, the dirty target's benefit
from polluting. Since there is no pollution the outcome is efficient. The
sender could not improve her situation if she could commit to some different
strategy, since offering H in each period is the best strategy even if
commitment were possible.
If l < I then things become much more complicated. Atthelow end of
this range the sander makes a low offer (strictly below H but not strictly
below L), and the clean target bluffs with positive probability. At the high
end the sender offers H in period 1 to forestall bluffing, but then offers 1.
in period 2. By credibly threatening to bluff in response to a low
first-period offer, the clean target Tholds up the sender for a high offer.
We now discuss these two outcomes in greater detail.-13-
2. Bluffing
Suppose that the sender offers a reward R, where L C R C H, in period 1.
If the clean target always rejected this offer then, since 61 C 0, the sender
is sufficiently sure that the target is clean that after rejection she would
offer L in period 2But the clean type would then always want to accept the
reward P. in period 1. But if the clean target always accepted the reward P. in
period 1 then the sender would know that a rejection meant that the target was
dirty, so she would offer H in period 2. The clean type would then reject K
in period 1. The only way out of this conundrum is for the sender and the
clean target to play mixed strategies, with the sender responding to rejection
of a low reward in period 1 by mixing between rewards of H and L in period 2,
and the clean target mixing between accepting and rejecting P. in period 1.
The sender's probability of making a high offer in period 2 must leave the
clean target indifferent between accepting and rejecting low offers in period
1, while the clean target's probability of rejecting low offers in period 1
must leave the sender indifferent between offering rewards H and L in
period 2.
Since the sender is indifferent only when 2 —6,'mustsatisfy (1).''
Mixing by the clean target means that he must be equally willing to acceptand
to reject low offers, which means thatit11mustsatisfy (2). There are a
continuum of equilibrium outcomes in which varies from 0 to 1, with the
lljftheclean target were to reject low offers with higher probability then
the sender would be sureenough thatshe was dealing with a bluffer that she
would offer only L in period 2, in which case the clean target should always
accept a low offer. But if the clean target were to rejectlow offers with
lower probability then the sender would be so sure that she was dealing with a
dirty type that she would offer only H in period 2. in which casethe clean
target should always reject a low offer. Only when the clean targetrejects
with this probability can he provide the sender an incentive to behavein a
way that is consistent with his decision.-14-
corresponding R varying froze 1. to H.1'
The cost to th. nnder and th. pollution amount





denotes the unconditional probability with which the target rejects a low
offer in period 1, either because he is dirty or because he is clean but
bluffing. substituting (5) into (4a) we get:
—(l-81)(R+L)+ 2810 + •(D-H)(D-R) (4b)
We can index the continuum of bluffing equilibria by R, which can range
between 1.. and H, and the corresponding r11.Iii the one that is best for the
sender R —Land —0.In this case the clean target fails to grab any
informational rent from the sender's ignorance about his type, since his
payoff is just 21. (what he would get if the sender were not trying to
"If the first-period offer aequals1. then the sender uses & pure strategy,
always offering 1. when this offer is rejected. The clean target is
indifferent between accepting and rejecting the first-period offer. If ii
denotesthe probability that he rejects this offer, there are a continuum of
equilibria in which ii varies between one and n as given in equation (1). We
focus on the best one for the sender, which has ii— x.This involves no real
loss of generality since the target is indifferent among all these and the
sender can force —bychoosing atobe slightly above L.-15-
influence him).Inthe worst oneforthe sender R —Uand —1,in which
case the clean target receives the dirty target's reward for one period.
Note, from (4a), that bluffers take themselves as costly to the sender as
truly dirty targets. Hence bluffing raises the sender's cost. This point is
made clearer bysplitting the sender's expected cost of dealing with the
target (4a) into three terms:
—(l-81)(R+L)+
61(D4-H)+(7-11)I(D+H)-(R+L)]. (4c)
The first is the sender's expected cost of compensating a clean target if he
were always to reveal his type in period 1, the second is her expected cost of
dealing with a dirty target, and the third is the cost created by the clean
target's bluffing. In a world in which the target's type were automatically
revealed to the sender at the end of the first period1 only the first two
terms would remain since the target could not bluff.
How does the sender's expected cost of dealing with the target respond to
changes in exogenous parameters? As one would expect, her cost increases with
D, the damage she herself suffers from pollution, with L, the extent to which
the clean target benefits from pollution, and with l' the initial likelihood
that the target is dirty. Increases in D and L not only raise her cost
directly, but increase the amount of bluffing. An increase in H, the dirty
target's payoff from pollution raises her direct costs but reduces the
incentive to bluff. The reason is that, as H rises toward D, the cost of
buying off a suspected dirty target approaches the cost of pollution itself.
The sender must be increasingly sure that she is dealing with a dirty type to
find offering H instead of suffering D worthwhile. Hence less and less
bluffing can occur in order for her to be willing to offer H. The effect of•16 -
anincrease in H in curtailing bluffing more than offsets its effect onthe
sender's direct cost. Hence the more a dirty target benefits from pollution
the better off is the sender.
I
Inthe bluffing equilibrium pollution occurs in period I with probability
7 and in period 2 with probability °l' Hence offering rewards fails to
achieve the efficient outcome of no pollution. Because of bluffing there is
even more pollution than would occur if the sender could commit to offering
only L both periods. This strategy would eliminate the incentive forthe
clean target to bluff. Only a dirty type would ever pollute. so that
pollution would occur each period with probability 81 C 7.
Th. sender's dil.a
A slight variation of the model shows how the sender might do better if
she could convincingly refrain from trying to exert any influence over the
target at all. Let L be slightly negative, so that, in the absence of any
incentive to bluff, the clean target would strictly prefer not to pollute. By
committing to laissez faire the sender could achieve a cost of 281D. But as
long as L is close to zero, her desire to pay a suspected dirty target not to
pollute creates an incentive for a clean target to bluff, even though
pollution is costly for him. Her cost even in the best outcome for her (when
L —it—0in rxpression (4b)), then rises.
3.The Hold Up
Instead of making a low offer in period 1, however, the sender could make
an offer H that would be accepted for sure by either type of target. She
would learn nothing about the target's type in period 1, so that —-17-
Since we are now dealing with the case in which < 9, she would then offer
only L in period 2. Her total cost offering H in period 1 would then be:
—H+ + (l-91)L. (6)
Comparing (6) with (4b), this strategy is better than offering a low reward in
period 1 if •l exceeds the critical value L
The sender's cost and the amount of pollution
In this outcome the sender again would benefit if she could commit to
offering L both periods. Here, however, the outcome is more efficient than
with commitment since commitment would entail more pollution, in contrast to
the bluffing equilibrium, where committing to pay just L would reduce
pollution.
IV. Punishing with a Mild Sanction
Now consider a sender who is trying to influence the target's decision by
threateninga mild punishment. At the beginning of each period the sender
decides whether or not to spend C to allow her to punish the target ifhe
pollutes that period. If she makestheexpenditureand the target pollutes
sheinflicts a cost P on him at no further cost to herself. Here we assume
that H >P>L,so that the threat of the punishment deters a clean but not a
dirty target.
Aswith seeking influence with rewards, there are three kinds of
equilibrium outcomes, depending on the sender's initial prior about the
target'stype:-18-
1. Cornolete Pooling: Again, pooling occurs if exceeds a threshold 6,
where now U —(D-C)/D.If the sender is initially this sure that the target
is dirty, she never imposes sanctions and never learns the target's type.
Either typeoftarget always pollutes.'3
2. Bluffing: If l < then the sender threatens sanctions in period 1.
The dirty target balks, suffering the punishment, as does the clean target
with positive probability. The sender renews the threat for sure if it worked
the first period and renews it with positive probability even if it failed.
The new threat always works against the clean target but never against the
dirty.
3. Delayed Sanctions: If the sender initially thinks that the target is
dirty with probability l' where 82 C < 6, then she waits until the second
period to threaten sanctions. Both types of target pollute the first period
as does the dirty target in the second period.
A. Optimal Strategies
To derive the parties' equilibrium strategies we again begin with second
period. At this point the threat of sanctions always works against the clean
target, but not against the dirty one. The sender believes that the target is
'3We ignore another perfect Bayesian (pooling) equilibrium in the range #1 > 8
which can arise if P > 2H. The sender threatens sanctions in period 1,
renewing them if and only if the target target did pollute. Neither target
pollutes in period 1, while both do in period 2. The beliefs needed to
support this equilibrium have the contrived property that period 1 pollution
makes the sender think that the target is more likely to be clean, even though
the dirty target has a stronger incentive to pollute.-19-
dirty with probability 82 so that the expected cost of threatening sanctions
is C +82D.If she does nothing either type of target will pollute, so her
cost is D. Comparing these costs determines the threshold 0.
Either type of target would prefer that the sender not threaten the
sanction. The threat lowers the payoff of the clean target from L to 0 and of
the dirty target from H to H -P.
Turnnow to period 1. The threat of sanctions would not deter a dirty -
targetfrom polluting both because the benefit of polluting exceeds the harm
of the punishment and because pollution will make the sender at least as
confident that the target is dirty.
The clean target's decision is more complicated. Knuckling under gives
away his type, so that —0and the sender will definitely renew the threat
in period 2. His total payoff over the two periods is zero. But if he
pollutes the sender may think it sufficiently likely that he is dirty that she
may decide not to renew the threat. His payoff then is L.P+(lwS)L. where
is the probability that the sender will renew the threat if the target
pollutes.
One possibility is that P >2L.In this case the clean target's gain
from pollution is so low relative to the pain inflicted by the sanction that
it is not worth suffering the penalty even one period in order to pollute both
periods. The threat will always deter a clean target.
More interesting is the case in which P < 2L. Here the clean target
would be willing to pollute and suffer the penalty in period I if he were sure
that it would lead to the lifting of sanctions the next period; the clean
target has an incentive to bluff. Here bluffing occurs to get sanctions
removed rather than to get a higher reward.
If the target does pollute in period 1, the sender believes that the-20-
target is dirty at the beginning of the next period with probability given by
(3), where now is the probability that the clean target balks at the threat
and pollutes in period 1.
B. Equilibrium Outcomes
The three equilibria emerge from this behavior as follows:
1. complete Pooling
> $ then the sender is sufficiently sure that she is dealing with a
dirty target that she will not threaten sanctions in period 2 even if she knew
that the clean target always bluffed in period 1. Hence the clean target
would necessarily bluff. The sender's payoff threatening sanctions in period
1isD+c.Inperiod 2 she would not threaten sanctions, so her payoff would
be D.This isworse for her than refraining from the threat at the beginning
of period 1. The threat is not worth using in either period, so the sender
suffers the cost of pollution each period.
2. Bluffing
If< the sender threatens the sanction in period 1 and the clean
target sometimes bluffs to try to get the sender to drop sanctions.If the
threat fails the first time the sender nevertheless renews it with positive
probability. Mixing occurs for the same reason that it does when the sender
uses rewards: If the clean target always bluffed then the sender would remain
sufficiently sure that the target was clean that she would always renew-21-
sanctions. But then the clean target would have no reason to bluff. But if
the clean target never bluffed then the sender would always drop sanctions if
they failed in the first period, giving the clean target reason to bluff. The
only equilibrium outcome is in mixed strategies: To make the parties
indifferent between their respective choices: (i) the clean target must bluff
with the probability at which —U(which continues to be given by
expression (1)) and (ii) the sender must renew sanctions after pollution
occurs with probability—(2L-P)/L.
The cost to the sender and th. amount of pollution
In the bluffing outcome the expected cost to the sender of threatening
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is the probability that the target will balk at sanctions in period 1, either
because he is dirty or because he is clean but bluffing.
In the second expression for C the sender's expected cost of dealing
with the target is again the probability-weighted sum of the cost of dealing
with a target who reveals himself to be clean, the cost of dealing with a
dirty target, and the cost from bluffing. Again, dealing with a target who
acts dirty is more costly than dealing with a target who comes clean the first-22-
period, so that a third cost is due to the bluffing caused by the sender's
attempts at influence.
Again, if the sender could commit to a policy, here imposing the sanction
each period regardless of the first-period response, then the clean target
would have no incentive to bluff. The sender's cost would be 2(61D+C), which
is less than her cost in the bluffing outcome. There is also less pollution.
3. Delayed Sanctions
When 82 < <Iand the sender does not impose sanctions in period 1
then both types of target would pollute. Since she learns nothing 2 —61
and
she would impose sanctions in period 2. Her expected cost from taking this
course of action is:
—(l+O}D
÷ C,
which is lower than the cost of imposing sanctions if 6 >
Herepotential bluffing causes the sender to eschew sanctions the first
period. The clean target exploits the sender's ignorance, but for one period,
rather than two, as in the pooling equilibrium. As in the equilibrium with
bluffing, the sender would benefit from an ability to commit to imposing
sanctions in period 2 regardless of the sender's period 1 actions. Unlike the
situation with rewards, where the threat of bluffing led to a hold up and lass
pollution than would occur if the sender could commit to a course of action,
here the potential for bluffing delays sanctions, so that there is more
pollution.-23-
C. Mild Threats vs. Promises
How does the sender fare threatening mild punishments rather than making
promises? To answer this question we compare her payoffs in the pooling,
bluffing, and intermediate outcomes, although the ranges over which these
outcomes occur typically differ between the two situations.
In the pooling equilibrium with threats the sender's cost is 2D, instead
of 214, the pooling payoff with rewards. Hence if the sender is very sure that
the target is dirty she is better off in a regime of rewards than of mild
sanctions.
in the intermediate equilibrium with threats the sender's cost is
(l+91)D +C.With rewards it is H +
91D
+(l-61)L.
It follows that rewards
are less costly as long as the cost of sanctions C exceed the clean target's
benefit of polluting L.
The comparison of the two bluffing outcomes is more complicated.
Comparing each component of the sender's cost, the relative cost of dealing
with a clean target who acquiesces in the first period is higher or lower
using rewards as C is higher or lower than L. Since sanctions ultimately do
not deter a dirty type, the cost of dealing with a target who acts dirty is
always higher using sanctions. Whether more bluffing occurs when the sender
uses sanctions is ambiguous. Sanctions are relatively immune from bluffing
when C is low, so that the sender is quite likely to impose them even when she
is quite doubtful that the target is dirty. Rewards are relatively immune
when H is near D, so that the sender must be quite sure that the target is
dirty before she offers H. Given that bluffing is going on, the sender will
find that it is less costly to influence the target with threats if sanctions
do not require any direct cost (i.e., if C —0),even though, unlike rewards,-24-
sanctions fail to deter a dirty target. As the cost of implementing sanctions
rises, however, rewards become the lower cost method of achieving influence.
V. Combining Threats and Promises
What happens if the sender can use both the promise of a reward and the
threat of the mild sanction in combination? In general the analysis is much
more complicated, and we do not provide a complete characterization. Rather
we discussan interesting point that the joint use ofthe two instruments
raises, showing how the sender's ability to use both can make her worse off
than if she were restricted to using just one or the other in isolation.
For simplicity we make the additional assumption that C CL.Under this
restriction, the sender will always threaten sanctions in period 2. They
deter a clean target more cheaply than an offer of L, and if she plans to
reward a dirty target not to pollute she need offer only H-F, rather than H,
for a net savings of P-C. (Recall that C CI.<P C H).
Henceher only decision is whether to offer H-P and deter pollution by
both types or not to offer anything, thereby deterring only the clean type.
The threshold probability is now 9 —(H-P)/D.If exceeds this amount the
sender will offer the reward as well as impose sanctions, while if is less
she will only impose sanctions.
As in the previous cases, if the sender's initial prior exceeds this
amount there is complete pooling. Compared with the case of the simple
reward, either target's payoff is lower since by using the sanction the sender
lowers the transfer that she makes to either type. The outcome is
nevertheless inefficient, since the threat imposes a real resource cost.
Consider what happens in the bluffing equilibrium, however. Having-25-
accessto the sanction changes the sender's payoff from (4b) to:
—(l-6)R+291D+ + 2C. (4d)
Thethreat acts to reduce the sender's cost in that she no longer has to
pay I. to a nonbluffing clean target (although she must incur the cost of the
threat over two periods). Moreover, the threat lowers the cost of buying out
a suspected dirty target in period 2. But as a consequence the sender is more
prone to go ahead and offer the reward to a possible dirty type. There is
thus more scope for bluffing than if the sender used only rewards in
isolation. Since bluffing hurts the sender, the net effect of having access
to the penalty (comparing the equilibria that are best for her in each case)
can easily be negative. This happens, for example, if I.. is near zero. As a
consequence, when the sender initially strongly suspects that the target is
clean, so that a bluffing equilibrium emerges, her total cost using both
instruments can be higher than if she could use just the reward. She would be
better off destroying her own ability to use the punishment. Even though
threatening the mild punishment in conjunction with promising rewards lowers
her direct cost of dealing with each type of target, threats can increase
bluffing to such an extent that she is worse off.
VI. Mild and Draconian Sanctions: Wolves in Sheep's Clothing
We now add to the sender's arsenal a draconian sanction that imposes so
much harm on the target that it would deter either type from polluting.
Threatening it costs the sender an amount F. The sender still has access to
the mild sanction that would deter the clean but not the dirty target. to-26-
keep things simple we assume that threatening the mild sanctionis costless.
In period 2. then, the gender's relevant decision is whether to impose
the draconian sanction and deter pollution for sure, at cost F <D,or to
impose only the mild sanction, risking pollution by theclean target, at an
expected cost 62D. Uhat she does thus depends upon the relationshipbetween
her belief the target is dirty and the threshold level 9 —F/D.
In period 1 the clean target knows that whatever the sender does in
period 2, he will not want to pollute. His payoff is zero regardless.He
consequently does not care whether the sender leans his type, and so will not
pollute as long as either sanction is threatened in period I.
Hence, if the dirty target balks at the mild sanction in period 1, he
blows his cover, —1,and the sender threatens the draconian sanction in
period 2. His payoff over both periods from balking at the mild sanction is
thus H-P.
If he acquiesces, however, his payoff is zero now but H-P if the sender
uses only mild sanctions the next period. Hence, if he thinks she would drop
them in period 2 he would be indifferent between polluting now and polluting
later. A mixing outcome can then emerge. Denote by the probability with
which the dirty target acquiesces to the mild sanction. 1hen confronted with
a target who acquiesced in the face of the mild sanction, thesender will
suspect that he is dirty with probability:
IJ
82 —elww
As long as the dirty target acquiesces to the first period sanction with a
probability low enough to keep 87 below $ he will dissuade the sender from-27-
the draconian threat in period 2.
The dirty target will want to choose in this range. If he acquiesced
with higher probability then the sender would impose the draconian sanction
even if he acquiesced the first period. His payoff from this Is 0, while
balking the first period would bring him H-P.
Hence the dirty target is willing to mix between acquiescing and balking
to the mild sanction with any probability between 0 and (l-91)F/[91(D.F)] (or
one1 if this amount exceeds one).
The sender is not indifferent to what the dirty target does, however.
Her payoff as a function of is:
— +8(l)(D4-F) —90+ (lW)F)
which falls as rises. The dirty target's mimicking of the clean target to
reduce sanctions the next period works to the sender's advantage.
The reason is that, if she imposes the mild sanction in period 1, the
dirty target is going to pollute exactly once, either in period 1, in which
case she will impose the draconian sanction in period 2, or wait until period
2. In the second case she avoids the cost of the draconian sanction. While
the dirty target is indifferent among a continuum of mixing probabilities, the
sender could coax him to the best one for her that is consistent with no
period 2 sanctions by offering a very small reward for not polluting in
period 1.
The sender could, of course, threaten the draconian sanction in period 1.
Her payoff would be if she dropped it in period 2 and 2F if she
maintained it for both periods. She does better threatening the mild sanction
in period 1 as long as C (F/D)(2-F/D). In one period of interaction she-28-
would impose the draconian sanction as long as > F/D. With repeated
interaction, however, she can usethedirty target's fear of subsequent
draconian threats to dissuade him from polluting currently. Hence for higher
values of she does better not making the draconian threat in the first
period. Rather, she uses the possibility of threatening it in the second
period to deter pollution in the first.
VII. Conclusion
We have shown how one's attempts to influence the actions of another can
be costly, futile, and even self-defeating. These problems can arise whether
one is seeking influence by promising to reward good behavior or threatening
to punish bad behavior.
Of the various situations we consider, the sender does best when she can
threaten a punishment that imposes more harmonthe target than the maximum
benefitthat he could obtain from taking the undesired course of action. In
this case the target's attempts to dissemble work in the sender's favor. In
order to avoid the threat the target behaves to trytosignal that the threat
is unnecessary.
In the absence of a draconian penalty, however, offering rewards or
threatening mild punishments can work to the sender's disadvantage. These
encourage behavior to increase the reward or to avoid the punishment:With
rewardsthe target wants to show that he needs &largereward to desist. With
mild punishments the target wants to show that they will not work. Bluffing
is most pervasive when the sender is most sure that the target is not really
benefiting that much from the action that she is trying to stop.
Ouranalysissuggests justsomeof the quandaries that limitations on our-29-
knowledge of others cause in tryingtoinfluence them. We have assumed that
all parameters except the target's benefit from taking an undesired action are
common knowledge. Other possible differences in information might pertain to
the target's suffering from the available penalties, as well as the damage
done to the sender by the target's actions, and the sender's cost of imposing
sanctions and paying rewards. These forms of informational asymmetries pose
additional problems. Our analysis preserves their exploration as topics for
future research.-30-
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